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Comments
BLOCKED AIRWAVES: USING LEGISLATION TO MAKE
NON-COMPETE CLAUSES UNENFORCEABLE IN THE
BROADCAST INDUSTRY AND THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF
PROPOSED LEGISLATION IN PENNSYLVANIA
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine getting in your car in the morning and switching the
radio to your favorite morning station to listen to the familiar voices
of personalities you listened to for years.1 Inexplicably, you find
that they are gone and that switching to other stations feels unsatisfying. 2 You are left driving to work in silence, without the laughter
to which you have become accustomed. 3 Now imagine that the reason for your silent drive to work is a few sentences in a contract that
prevent these on-air personalities from returning to the airwaves for
a year. 4 After a year, you have probably moved on to another station, perhaps the new station is not quite as enjoyable, but you have
5
become used to it and do not wish to change.
1. Cf Pathfinder Commc'ns Corp. v. Macy, 795 N.E.2d 1103, 1112 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003) (explaining evidence that radio stations have large audience during
morning drive time than any other time of day). "The evidence presented at the
hearing revealed that, in general, the morning drive time slot is the most important day period for a radio station in terms of generating the largest audience and
revenue .. " Id.
2. See, e.g., It's Official: Preston & Steve Cross to WMAM FMQB, Feb. 11, 2005,
http://fmqb.com/article.asp?id=67043 [hereinafter FMQB article] (discussing
Preston and Steve show's disappearance from Y-100 and subsequent move to
WMMR).
3. Cf. id. (explaining strong connection Preston and Steve personalities have
with their audience). "'Preston & Steve match up perfectly with the WMMR morning audience,' said Program Director Bill Weston. 'They're pop culture junkies,
know Philadelphia inside and out, and possess a true love for their audience and
they're hilarious!'" Id. 2.
4. Cf. Wilson v. Radio One, Inc., No. 05-1087, at 2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2005)
(order granting preliminary injunction) (explaining that combination of noncompete and anti-solicitation clauses in Wilson and Morrison's, also known as Preston and Steve, contracts would "preclude them from appearing on-air on WMMR
until February 24, 2006, one year after Plaintiffs' employment with Defendant
terminated").
5. Cf id. at 3 ("Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm and loss if they are (a)
unnecessarily and inappropriately deprived of their livelihood, (b) subjected to the
loss of an unascertainable number of loyal rock format listeners, and (c) denied an
opportunity to commence on-air appearances immediately.").

(391)
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This scenario is what the court addressed in Wilson v. Radio
One, Inc., where the court decided to grant a preliminary injunction
in favor of two broadcasting personalities known as "Preston and
Steve." 6 The injunction prevented their employer, Radio One, Inc.,
from enforcing a non-compete clause against them. 7 The court's
decision reflects a concern that on-air personalities who try to return to their former audiences often face uncertain and difficult
futures as a consequence of employment contract provisions known
as non-compete clauses.8
This Comment explores non-compete clauses generally, from
common law to statutory modifications. 9 Section III analyzes the
application of non-compete law in the broadcasting world, discussing what courts in different states found reasonable and the situations in the broadcast industry that make applying non-competes
particularly difficult.1 0 This section also discusses legislative efforts
to handle non-competes, focusing specifically on those states with
statutes that prohibit courts from enforcing non-competes in
broadcasting. I1

Section III goes on to apply the proposed Pennsylvania law to
Wilson, examining the proposed legislation's sufficiency. 12 It then
applies the broadcasting non-compete laws of other jurisdictions to
the facts of Wilson.' 3 Furthermore, Section III continues with an
6. See id. at 3-5 (refusing to enforce defendants' non-compete agreements).
7. See id. at 4 (providing court order and barring enforcement of restrictive
non-compete covenant).
8. See Marlo D. Brawer, Note, Switching Stations: The Battle over Non-Compete
Agreements in the Broadcasting Industry, 27 OKLA. CTy U. L. REv. 693, 710 (2002)
(referring to radio personalities' weakened economic position due to non-competes). The author stated:

[B]roadcasters who sign non-compete agreements are generally unable
to increase their salaries more than a minimal cost of living raise during

contract negotiations, because employers know other stations in the market cannot pay broadcasters more without risking the loss of the broad-

casters' popularity while waiting out the duration of a non-compete

agreement.
Id. (citing Telephone Interview with Steve Hertz, President, If Management, in
New York, NY (Sept. 1, 2001)).
9. For a further discussion of non-compete clauses generally, see infra notes
16-54 and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of the application of non-compete clauses in the
broadcast industry, see infra notes 55-124 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of the legislation dealing with non-compete
clauses, see infra notes 125-49 and accompanying text.
12. For a further discussion of the proposed Pennsylvania statute, see infra
notes 150-63 and accompanying text.
13. For a further discussion of the application of Pennsylvania's proposed law
and non-compete legislation in other states to the Wilson case, see infra notes 16381 and accompanying text.
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analysis of laws prohibiting non-competes in broadcasting and ex14
amines pending state laws that seek to prevent such prohibition.
Section IV evaluates the necessity of laws preventing the enforcement of non-competes in the broadcasting industry and recommends Pennsylvania codify the holding in Wilson to prevent similar
15
situations in the future.
II.

BACKGROUND: NON-COMPETE CLAUSES

Non-compete clauses are applicable in virtually all areas of business. Consequently, jurisdictions have developed a body of statutory and case law to interpret and apply these provisions in various
circumstances. 16 Courts' basic analyses examine the clause in terms
of its reasonableness of location, duration, and activities
forbidden.'

7

A.

What are Non-Compete Agreements?

Non-compete clauses are agreements which employers include
in employment contracts to ensure that for a period of time after
the employee leaves the employer, s/he will not work for a competitor in certain positions. 18 The general purpose of a non-compete
clause is to "prevent unscrupulous employees from appropriating
confidential trade information and customer relationships for their
own benefit, so that employers can invest optimally in research, employee training, improvement of business methods, and client relationships without fearing that their investments will be lost. . .."19
14. For a further discussion of the positive and negative consequences of statutes preventing enforcement of non-competes, see infra notes 182-220 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of whether laws preventing the enforcement of
non-competes are needed and looking at Pennsylvania's proposed law, see infra
notes 221-30 and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the general body of case law that has developed on non-compete clauses, see infra notes 35-54 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of statutory law, see infra notes 125-42 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of factors courts examine for detenining reasonableness of non-competes, see infra notes 35-54 and accompanying text.
18. See Peter M. Gould, Noncompetition Provisions in Media Industry Contracts, 1,
http://www.bcfm.com/financial-manager/Decjan0203/NonCompete.pdf (last
visited Mar. 16, 2006) (providing brief definition of non-compete provisions).
19. Alice J. Baker, Legislative Prohibitions on the Enforcement of Post-Employment
Covenants Not to Compete in the BroadcastingIndustry, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.L.J.
647, 649 (2001) (citing Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreement Not to Compete, 73
HARv. L. REv. 625, 626 (1960)).
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Non-compete clauses are often used by employers, arguably to em20
ployees' detriment, in rapidly changing technological industries.
In broadcasting contracts, employers argue that non-compete
clauses have a slightly different purpose. 21 In this industry, employers sometimes claim that the training and skill they provided to the
employee is in the form of advertising dollars spent promoting the
employee's personality.2 2 In some cases, this argument has been
23
successful.

20. See Ann C. Hodges & Porcher L. Taylor, III, The Business Falloutfrom the
Rapid Obsolescence and Planned Obsolescence of High-Tech Products: Downsizing of Noncompetition Agreements, 6 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REv. 3, 3 (2005) (discussing use of
non-competes in technological industries). The authors stated:
The recent rapid pace of technological change has made human
capital more important, yet it has rendered the employee's knowledge
base obsolete more quickly. Employers use covenants not to compete,
restricting employees from switching to work for competitors, in order to
retain knowledgeable personnel. Currently, the lack of predictability in
interpreting noncompete agreements allows employers to draft overlylengthy noncompetes, encourages enforcement litigation, and curtails
employees from changing jobs because of the fear of litigation. Employees should not be prevented from working for competitors for longer
than is necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interest.
Id.
21. See Brawer, supranote 8, at 724-25 (discussing employer's attempt to claim
advertising efforts as "legitimate business interest" in enforcing non-competes).
Courts often require employers to provide a legitimate business interest in order
for a non-compete clause to be held reasonable. See id. at 697 ("Employers do not
have a protectable interest in avoiding ordinary competition.").
22. See Midwest Television, Inc. v. Oloffson, 699 N.E.2d 230, 233 (Ill.
App. Ct.
1998) (analyzing whether advertising is sufficient legitimate business interest);
New River Media Group, Inc. v. Knighton, 429 S.E.2d 25, 26 (Va. 1993) (presenting three criteria and assessing whether promotional spending on personality satisfied legitimate business interest). The Virginia Supreme Court articulated the
three criteria as:
In determining whether a noncompetition agreement is valid and enforceable, we apply the following criteria:
(1) Is the restraint, from the standpoint of the employer, reasonable in
the sense that it is no greater than is necessary to protect the employer in
some legitimate business interest?
(2) From the standpoint of the employee, is the restraint reasonable in
the sense that it is not unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing his legitimate efforts to earn a livelihood?
(3) Is the restraint reasonable from the standpoint of a sound public
policy?
New River Media Group, 429 S.E.2d at 26.
23. See Midwest Television, 699 N.E.2d at 233 (declaring television station successfully demonstrated that "Oloffson offered a unique 'product'" that station developed via advertising dollars); New River Media Group, 429 S.E.2d at 26 (applying
three criteria and finding employer's spending on promotion satisfied legitimate
business interest).
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Complications in the Broadcasting Industry

Non-competes are particularly unfair to employees in the
broadcasting industry due to two unique circumstances. First, finding an on-air broadcasting position is extremely difficult. 24 Second,

an employee's personality may have become 25popular for reasons
other than the employer's advertising efforts.
As a result of these concerns, some jurisdictions have created
legislation that prevents courts from enforcing non-compete
clauses in the broadcasting industry. 26 Because of these laws, courts
will more likely grant preliminary injunctions that prevent broadcasting employers from enforcing non-competes. 27 This is the case
in Pennsylvania, where a state senator has proposed a bill that
would prevent broadcasting employers from including non-com28
pete agreements in their employment contracts.
C.

History of Non-Competes

Non-compete clauses have existed since at least the early fifteenth century. 29 In 1415, in England, the first case dealing with a
non-compete clause struck the clause down. 30 Courts upheld noncompete clauses in the eighteenth century if the court found adequate consideration for the clause and that the covenant was reasonable.3 1 Later, the English courts required that the covenants
24. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 711 (describing rareness of obtaining broadcasting position).
25. See id. at 725-26 (detailing other factors, such as "personality" and community involvement, which help broadcasters gain popularity and relying on Richmond Bros., Inc. v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 256 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Mass. 1970)).
26. For a discussion of legislation created to prohibit enforcement of noncompetes, see infra notes 125-42 and accompanying text.
27. See Asher Hawkins, BroadcastersLook to Shrug off Yoke of Non-Competes, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 1, 2005, at 1 (suggesting effect of legislation on court
decisions).
28. See id. at 8 (discussing Sen. Jane Clare Orie's proposed legislation). While
not specifically mentioning the legislation, one Pennsylvania court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of employees after the legislation was proposed. See
Wilson v. Radio One, Inc., No. 05-1087, at 2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2005) (order granting preliminary injunction) (preventing enforcement of non-compete agreement
against two on-air personalities).
29. See Hess v. Gebhard & Co., Inc., 808 A.2d 912, 917 (Pa. 2002) (exploring
history of non-compete clauses and their invalidity under English common law).
30. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 694 (citing Charles E. Carpenter, Validity of
Contracts Not to Compare, 76 U. PA. L. REv. 244 (1928)) (discussing early case striking down non-compete against dyer).
31. See Hess, 808 A.2d at 917 (discussing reasonableness test established in
eighteenth century); see also Brawer, supra note 8, at 695 (noting typical requirements, including consideration, for non-competes in eighteenth century English
courts).
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reasonably restrain location and duration. 32 The English courts
eventually allowed more far-reaching clauses to stand, without inquiring into the reasonableness of a particular clause's location and
duration provisions.3 3 The United States courts would have proba34
bly rejected such strong restraints on trade.
D.

General Requirements

As with other contracts, courts require consideration, offer,
and acceptance in order to enforce non-compete agreements. 35
Then, to determine whether to actually enforce the clause, courts
balance the business's protectable legitimate interest against the
clause's reasonableness. 36 Reasonableness consists of three elements: the reasonableness of (1) the geographical area covered by
the clause, (2) the length of time the clause will be in effect, and
(3) the range of activities or employment positions described in the
clause. 37 Instead of imposing a "bright line rule," courts engage in
a fact-specific examination of each case to determine whether the
clause in question meets the reasonableness requirements in the

jurisdiction. 38 In conducting case specific analyses, the majority of
32. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 695 (establishing factors English courts used to
analyze and evaluate reasonableness).
33. See id. (explaining shift in English law).
34. Cf Hess, 808 A.2d at 918 (noting U.S. courts are less likely to enforce
agreements stifling competition).
35. See Louis J. Papa, Employee Beware! Employment Agreements and What the Technology Related Employee Should Know and Understand Before Signing that Agreement: A
PracticalGuide, 19 TouRo L. REv. 393, 395 (2003) (discussing general requirements
courts seek in determining contract enforceability):
In order for an agreement to be enforceable, the agreement must
include all of the elements of a valid contract. Therefore, there must be
an offer, acceptance, consideration, the agreement must be entered into
for a lawful purpose and both parties must possess the requisite capacity
to enter such an agreement.
Id.
36. See, e.g., Hess, 808 A.2d at 920 (balancing reasonableness with employer
interests); Richmond Bros., Inc. v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 256 N.E.2d 304, 307
(Mass. 1970) (applying balancing test to broadcasting non-compete); Brawer, supra
note 8, at 697 ("[T] he employer seeking to enforce such a covenant must identify
a protectable interest."); Hodges and Taylor III, supra note 20, at 2 ("Employees
cannot be prevented from working for competitors for longer than necessary to
protect the employer's legitimate interest.").
37. See Baker, supra note 19, at 648 (listing elements courts considered reasonable in modern non-compete enforcement litigation).
38. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 696 (summarizing case-by-case nature of noncompete review in courts).
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jurisdictions apply the rules established in the Restatement of
39

Contracts.

Courts vary by jurisdiction as to the extent of how geographically far-reaching a clause may be before declaring it invalid. 40 For
example, one court upheld a boundless non-compete covenant due
to the extent of the business's contacts. 4 1 Courts also generally uphold non-compete covenants covering an employer's market area. 42
Courts also review the reasonableness of the length of time the
clause remains in effect. 43 Reasonableness also depends upon the

jurisdiction and sometimes the field of employment. 44 In most
39. See Baker, supra note 18, at 651 ("[O]n the enforcement of covenants not
to compete, most jurisdictions in the United States follow the rule set forth in the
Restatement of Contracts ... ."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs:
ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS ON COMPETITION § 188 (1981) (asserting reasonableness test
for non-compete agreements). The Restatement states:
(1) A promise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint that is
ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in restraint of trade if
(a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee's
legitimate interest, or
(b) the promisee's need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public.
(2) Promises imposing restraints that are ancillary to a valid transaction
or relationship include the following:
(b) a promise by an employee or other agent not to compete with
his employer or other principal ....
RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS § 188.

40. See, e.g., Brawer, supra note 8, at 696 (citing Brian M. Malsberger, Covenant
Not to Compete: A State-by-State Survey, 2000 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT, 560, 611 (2d
ed. 2001)) (noting courts have upheld clauses covering hundreds of miles have
been upheld).
41. See, e.g., Superior Consulting Co. v. Walling, 851 F. Supp. 839, 847 (E.D.
Mich. 1994) (upholding clause with no geographic limitation because business's
contacts were sufficiently international in scope).
42. See Baker, supra note 19, at 652 (describing typical acceptable geographic
limit on non-competes).
43. See Hess v. Gebhard, 808 A.2d 912, 918 (Pa. 2002) (noting duration and
location as main factors U.S. courts examine for reasonableness); see also Baker,
supra note 19, at 652-53 (citations omitted) (providing duration typically reviewed
for reasonableness in non-compete enforcement cases and listing cases enforcing

two year covenants).
44. See, e.g., Baker, supranote 19, at 653 (citing Earth Web, Inc. v. Schlack, 71
F. Supp. 2d 299, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing difference in technology fields
where imposition of non-compete for one year might seriously impact marketable
skills); Hodges and Taylor III, supra note 20, at 1-3 (discussing unfairness of enforcing unnecessarily long non-competes in technology industry). For a further
discussion of the differences between jurisdictions, see infra notes 126-42 and accompanying text.
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states, courts typically enforce non-compete covenants that last for
4
one or two years.

5

In evaluating the reasonableness of the range of activities a
non-compete clause prohibits, courts balance the employer's interests with the community's interest in competition and availability of
skill sets. 4 6 Additionally, courts often consider the employee's inter-

est in earning a livelihood. 47 For unreasonable clauses, courts disagree on the most effective remedy for the injured party.48 The
majority view modifies an imperfect covenant, making it enforceable under slightly different terms. 49 There is some support, how-

50
ever, for striking the entire clause if it is partially unenforceable.
On the other hand, when the non-compete clause is found reasonable, employers sometimes request equitable relief or specific
performance, which often comes in the form of a preliminary injunction. 5 1 Granting such a drastic remedy is sometimes difficult or

45. See Baker, supra note 19, at 652-53 (noting range of non-compete duration
most courts are typically willing to accept); see, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. McCarthy, 379 F.3d
576, 578 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding one year non-compete for executive); Benchmark Med. Holdings v. Barnes, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1268 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (upholding parts of two year, seventy-five mile non-compete clause for physical
therapist).
46. See, e.g., Nike, 379 F.3d at 584 (applying balancing test of employer interest
against public interest); Beckman v. Cox Broad. Corp., 296 S.E.2d 566, 568 (Ga.
1982) (considering public's interest in competition).
47. See, e.g., Benchmark Med. Holdings, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 1257 (discussing Alabama's four-factor test including imposition of undue hardship on employee and
employer's interest); Beckman, 296 S.E.2d at 568 (noting trial court's evaluation of
economic impact on employee); Cullman Broad. Co. v. Bosley, 373 So. 2d 830, 836
(Ala. 1979) (balancing employer interest against employee hardship).
48. See Baker, supra note 19, at 654-55 (citations omitted) (noting disagreement of courts listing contradicting court decisions).
49. See id. (discussing minority and majority rule).
50. See, e.g., Pathfinder Commc'ns Corp. v. Macy, 795 N.E.2d 1103, 1114 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2003) (discussing "blue pencil" method, which strikes out unreasonable
provisions); Gould, supra note 18, at 1 (discussing different approaches states take
in dealing with unreasonable non-compete provisions).
51. See Baker, supra note 19, at 655 (describing employer's preference for
specific performance). Baker noted:
From the employer's perspective, specific performance of the covenant
not to compete has two advantages: (1) it gives the employer greater
leverage over a breaching employee because ordinary contract damages
will frequently be smaller than the gain the employee will realize if she
breaches; and (2) specific performance avoids the valuation problem that
would otherwise face an employer seeking damages for breach of a covenant not to compete.
Id. (citing Stewart A. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital.79 VA. L. REV.
383, 388-89 (1993)).
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unfair, especially if there is a remedy at law. 52 If a court decides to
award breach of contract damages instead of granting equitable relief, valuation becomes an issue. 5 3 Determining monetary damages
in this situation is difficult because of the uncertainty of the value
that an employee gained, or an employer lost, as a result of the
54
breach.
III.

ANALYSIS:

NON-COMPETES IN THE BROADCAST INDUSTRY

In the broadcast industry, most employers require the majority
of their employees to sign non-competes. 55 Established journalists,
however, such as Geraldo Rivera, are often free to move between
competing broadcasters without legal complications. 56 Most people who aspire to become broadcasters must start in a small local
market in which they will most likely have to sign a non-compete. 57
Heavy competition and low turnover vex the industry, making it

highly unlikely that most contenders will obtain the prestigious onair positions they seek. 58 In smaller markets, on-air news reporters
make less than $25,000 a year. 59
Broadcasters' worth includes their name-recognition in the
market. 60 But if they want to leave their current position, they have
to wait until their non-compete expires before they can obtain a
similar position, at which time this name-recognition will likely have
52. Cf id. (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs § 367(2) (1981))
(explaining injunctions will not be enforced if employee would be left without
reasonable means of making income).
53. See id. at 655-56 (mentioning difficulty in determining damages).
54. See id. (noting factors complicating determination of damages).
55. See Deborah Potter, ContractualServitude: Some States Outlaw Dreaded NonCompete Clauses, AM. JOURNALISM REv., April 2002, available at http://www.new-

slab.org/articles/noncompetes.htm (noting prevalent use of non-competes in
broadcasting contracts).
56. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 693-94 (discussing employers' differing treatment of "big name" broadcasters and local broadcaster in requiring noncompetes).
57. See id. at 709 (describing typical path of broadcasting careers).
58. See id. (explaining difficulty of obtaining job in broadcasting).
59. See Radio-Television News Dir. Ass'n & Found.: 2000 Radio and Television Salary Survey, (2000), http://www.rtnda.org/research/salaries00.html (providing "Television News Salaries" chart showing median salary for television news
reporter as $24,000, and "Radio News Salaries" chart showing median salary for
radio news reporter as $20,000).
60. See, e.g., Beckman v. Cox Broad. Corp., 296 S.E.2d 566, 567 (Ga. 1982)
(discussing how "WSB-TV spent in excess of one million dollars promoting 'Beckman's name, voice and image" in order to increase Beckman's value to WSB-TV's
Action News Team).
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lost its value. 6 1 Employers argue that they paid for this "product"
(the personality's popularity) through their own advertising efforts
and are, therefore, entitled to any profit they gained from it. 6 2 Employers sometimes lose because they cannot provide an adequate
legitimate business interest.63 In some cases, courts do not consider
64
the "advertising costs" to be adequate interests.
When employers prevail on an argument that they lose the
benefit of their investment through advertising in a "personality,"
broadcasting employees lose what may be the single most important
trait that they have acquired through their employment: namely,
fame. 6 5 Without the benefit of popularity, the broadcaster often
has difficulty finding ajob. 66 Further, some employers require noncompete agreements regardless of whether the employee is on- or
off-air. Such action causes these employees to remain unemployed

61. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 710 (describing issues broadcasters face when
deciding to leave position).
62. See Baker, supra note 19, at 657-59 (explaining broadcasting employers'
typical arguments for non-compete clauses); see also Gould, supra note 18, at 2 (discussing employer's interest in non-competes). Gould states:
Covenants not to compete have been used in the media industry for
years because employers invest substantial resources to recruit, train, market, and remunerate on-air talent. Media employers expend considerable
time, money, and effort to create recognizable stars that drive performance and ratings. On-air talent often acquire a high level of recognition
and popularity as a result of their employment and the related efforts by
their employers to nurture and promote these talents. As a result, these
employees are capable of siphoning audience if they are able to work for
a direct competitor immediately following the employment term.
Gould, supra note 18, at 2.
63. See, e.g., West Group Broad., Ltd. v. Bell, 942 S.W.2d 934, 938-39 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997) (denying employer's argument that employee interfered with customer contacts satisfied legitimate business interest requirement).
64. See, e.g., Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Wilson v. Radio One,
Inc., No. 05-1087, at 11 (E.D. Pa. filed May 3, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Wilson Findings] (finding employer, Radio One, did not have legitimate business interest to enforce non-compete provision). Any interest in goodwill between
the plaintiffs and Y-100 listeners had been abandoned by the employer's decision
to "change music formats to a format that targets a different population of listeners." Id. "Defendant's only motivation for enforcing the Non-Compete Covenants
is to prevent Plaintiffs from appearing on WMMR, allowing Defendant ostensibly
to gain an economic advantage in advertising revenue. This economic advantage
does not constitute a legitimate business interest requiring enforcement of the
Non-Compete Covenants." Id.
65. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 710 (explaining negative effect of non-compete enforcement on broadcasting careers).
66. See id. (noting difficulty broadcasting employees face after non-compete
enforcement).
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for the duration of a non-compete even though the employer has
67
not expended advertising dollars to promote them.
A.

Wilson v. Radio One, Inc.

In Wilson v. Radio One, Inc., Philadelphia radio personalities
Preston Wilson and Steve Morrison (referred to on-air as "Preston
and Steve") tried to void their non-compete clauses. 68 Their former
employer, Radio One, owned the WPLY ("Y-100") station where
Wilson and Morrison conducted a morning show. 6 9 On February
24, 2005, Y-100 converted from a rock station to an "urban" station
called "The Beat. '70 As of that date, Radio One, Inc. no longer
71
operated a rock station in the Philadelphia area.
The plaintiffs petitioned for, and successfully obtained, a preliminary injunction against the broadcasting company preventing it
from enforcing the duo's non-compete clauses. 72 Thus, Wilson and
Morrison could pursue positions with another radio station called
WMMR. 73 Due to the preliminary injunction, WMMR did not have
to wait for the non-compete clauses in Wilson and Morrison's contracts to expire. Wilson and Morrison could commence employment with WMMR as soon as the station was prepared to put them
74
on the air.

67. See Potter, supra note 55 (discussing use of non-competes in broadcast
industry beyond on-air personality contracts). Potter states:
[P] roducers today are almost as likely to be covered by a non-compete
agreement as on-air reporters. Bob Papper of Ball State University who

tracks broadcast news contracts says about half of all reporters and producers are under non-competes. Even photographers and assignment
editors-mostly anonymous and never promoted on billboards-are having
to sign contracts that would force them to wait six months or longer

before taking ajob with a competitor. According to Papper's 2000-2001
survey, the percentage of TV news people covered by non-competes
jumped almost 17 percent in just one year, to 43 percent.
Id. 5.
68. See Wilson v. Radio One, Inc., No. 05-1087, at 4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2005)
(order granting preliminary injunction) (summarizing motions made for injunction to prevent enforcement of non-compete clauses).
69. See id. at 1-2 (explaining relationship between Radio One, Inc. and Y-100).
70. See id. (discussing replacement station).
71. See id. at 2 (finding defendant ceased to operate rock station in Philadelphia due to changed format).
72. See id. at 4 (granting plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction to strike
non-compete agreements in employment agreements).
73. See FMQB article, supra note 2 (announcing Wilson and Morrison's agreement to join WMMR).
74. Cf Hawkins, supra note 27, at 1 (explaining when Wilson and Morrison
would begin hosting morning show on WMMR).
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In response, Wilson and Morrison's former employer moved
for an injunction to prevent Wilson and Morrison from going onair, impliedly arguing that the former morning show hosts would
detract from the station's advertisers and audience. 75 The employer also argued that it had invested in Wilson and Morrison's
show in order to generate goodwill with listeners, the benefit of
which would be lost if Wilson and Morrison were able to appear on
another morning show. 76 The employees, on the other hand, ar-

gued that the station had entirely changed its format and no longer
existed. 77 They argued further that it was unfair to hold Wilson and
Morrison to their contracts because the employer altered the contracts of other Y-100 employees to allow them to work for a station
78
with a different musical format than "The Beat."
The court found Wilson and Morrison's arguments more persuasive. 79 Determining that the employer lacked a legitimate business interest to enforce the covenants, the court granted the
preliminary injunctions in favor of Wilson and Morrison.8 0 The
court further found that the defendant's only motivation for enforcing the non-competes was to "gain an economic advantage in
advertising revenue. 8 1 According to the court this did not consti82
tute a legitimate business interest.
The court determined that Wilson and Morrison would "suffer
irreparable harm" and would be deprived of their livelihood if injunctive relief was denied.8 3 The court was also concerned that Wilson and Morrison would lose their "loyal rock format listeners" and
believed that this contributed to the necessity of granting injunctive
relief.84 Consequently, Wilson and Morrison were permitted to
start their morning show on WMMR in August of 2005.85 The out75. See Wilson, No. 05-1087, at 2 (discussing employer's concerns).
76. See id. (discussing arguments advanced by employers in defense of enforcing non-compete provisions).
77. See id. at 2-3 (finding Y-100 no longer operates rock station in Philadelphia
area).
78. See id. (discussing arguments made by Wilson and Morrison).
79. See id. at 4 (granting plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction).
80. See Wilson, No. 05-1087, at 3-4 (explaining reasoning behind court's
determination).
81. See id. at 11 (noting employer's argument).
82. See id. (finding defendant failed to prove any legitimate business interest
to make non-compete clauses enforceable).
83. See id. at 11-12 (describing findings and conclusions of court).
84. See id. (explaining plaintiffs' harm if injunctive relief not granted).
85. See FMQB article, supra note 2 ("As FMQB first reported in mid-January,
Greater Media has snagged WPLY (YI00)/Philadelphia morning show, The Preston & Steve Show, and pulled them across the street to takeover mornings for
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come in Wilson represents a victory for broadcasting employees because courts generally do not grant such preliminary injunctions.8 6
87
The majority of similar cases setde.
B. Judicial Enforcement of Non-Competes
Courts evaluate the reasonableness of a clause on a case by case
basis,8 8 looking at such facts as an employer's legitimate business
interest,8 9 location,9 0 duration, 9 1 and range of activities. 9 2 Based on
the courts' analyses of case and statutory law, where applicable, the
clause is found to be enforceable, 93 partially enforceable, 94 or
95
void.
1. Employers' Legitimate ProtectableInterest
In some cases, broadcasting employers have difficulty formulating legitimate business interests or injury in order to satisfy this asMainstream Rocker WMMR. After sitting out a non-compete clause, the duo will
debut on WMMR in August 2005."); see also Wilson, No. 05-1087, at 4 (enjoining
defendant from interfering with plaintiffs' employment "as on-air personalities for
WMMR or in any other manner with another Rock radio station").
86. See Asher Hawkins, Local DJs Win Preliminary Order, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
Apr. 27, 2005, at 1 [hereinafter Hawkins, Local] ("Barry Skidelsky, a former broadcaster and New York solo practitioner who frequently represents on-air personalities during contract negotiations, noted that preliminary injunctions are typically
difficult to obtain in any type of litigation.").
87. See id. (" 'Few disputes involving broadcast non-competes get to court, and
most rarely go through trial - like many litigations, they frequently settle.'" (quoting Barry Skidelsky, former WMMR broadcaster)).
88. See, e.g., Cullman Broad. Co. v. Bosley, 373 So. 2d 830, 833 (Ala. 1979)
("[T] he validity of a covenant not to compete is dependent on the particular facts
of each case.").
89. See, e.g., Richmond Bros., Inc. v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 256 N.E.2d
304, 307 (Mass. 1970) (assessing reasonableness of duration in light of employer's
business interest).

90. See, e.g., Wake Broads., Inc. v. Crawford, 114 S.E.2d 26, 28 (Ga. 1960)
(finding extent of location requirement unreasonable).
91. See Midwest Television, Inc. v. Oloffson, 699 N.E.2d 230, 235 (Ill.
App. Ct.
1998) (finding duration reasonable as it corresponded to time period needed by
employer to acquire customers).
92. See id. (determining reasonableness of activities prohibited).
93. See id. at 233-36 (concluding clause reasonable and issuing injunction in
favor of employer).
94. See Pathfinder Commc'ns v. Macy, 795 N.E.2d 1103, 1114 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003) (applying "blue pencil" method to make clause reasonable by striking divisible, unreasonable portions of the non-compete).
95. See Cullman Broad. Co. v. Bosley, 373 So. 2d 830, 833 (Ala. 1979) (noting
Alabama law holds non-competes generally void "except that an agent, servant or
employee may agree with his employer not to engage in or carry on a similar business and not solicit old customers of the employer").
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pect of the court's review. 96 For example, in West Group
Broadcasting,Ltd. v. Bell, the court held that the employer lacked
evidence that the employee's violation of her non-compete agreement interfered with its legitimate business interests of customer
retention and advertising revenue. 97 The arguments failed because
when she worked at the new radio station, the radio personality created a new persona by changing her name. 98 The court found that
her new radio program for a rival station was sufficiently different
that it did not directly compete with her former employer. 99
Wilson also discusses an employer's failure to establish a legitimate business purpose for enforcing non-compete provisions in
their employment contracts. 10 0 In that case, the employer seemed
to argue that switching Wilson and Morrison's morning show to
WMMR might cause Radio One, Inc.'s "The Beat" to lose audience
members. 10 1 This argument failed because of the stations' different

96. See, e.g., West Group Broad., Ltd. v. Bell, 942 S.W.2d 934, 938-39 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997) (finding employer failed to show legitimate protectable interest in relation to employee recognition on rival station); KWEL, Inc. v. Prassel, 527 S.W.2d
821, 823 (Tex. App. 1975) (analyzing employer testimony and concluding employer lacked evidence that employee's violation of non-compete clause caused
loss of advertising audience).
97. See West Group Broad., 942 S.W.2d at 938-39 (finding no evidence that former employee interfered with customer contacts or advertising revenue by obtaining position at rival station).
98. See id. at 938 (discussing employee's creation of new persona for new radio position and lack of evidence employee used name recognition provided to
her by previous employer's advertising expenditures).
99. See id. (rejecting employer's argument that employee interfered with any
legitimate business interest by working on-air at competing station). The court
stated:
Although West created Hurricane Hannah as Bell's radio personality and
used its resources to promote Hurricane Hannah as part of KXDG's image, there is no evidence that at KSYN Bell ever used or attempted to
capitalize on that personality or name recognition. The only things that
Bell took with her and used when she went from KXDG to KSYN were her
aptitude, skill, mental ability, and the voice with which she was born. At
KSYN, Bell assumed a new name, Robin Kane. She worked a different
time slot, 5:30 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.; and was merely a co-host with a male
announcer. At KSYN, she read the news and bantered with the cohost.
The music on KSYN, which was announced by Robin Kane's co-host, was
contemporary music, not the country format of KXDG.
Id.
100. See Wilson Findings, No. 05-1087, at 11 (E.D. Pa. filed May 3, 2005) (on
file with author) (arguing defendant's potential loss of advertising revenue was not
legitimate business interest).
101. Contra id. at n.9 (rejecting employer's argument and rationale from conclusions of law).
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musical formats.' 0 2 Radio One, Inc. no longer had an interest in
retaining the same audience or advertisers because it had changed
its format from rock to urban; therefore, its business interest ceased
10 3
to be legitimate.
2.

Location

In restricting location, most broadcasting non-compete agreements prohibit an employee from working anywhere within the
market area of a particular station.' 0 4 Most enforceable clauses
punish employees for working for a competitor within the same region where the original employer's broadcasts are available. 10 5 In
one case, the court evaluated a non-compete clause which prevented the employee from working in the vicinity of any office established by the employer, regardless of when the contract clause
existed.1 0 6 The court found that this location requirement was unreasonable because it would be nearly impossible for the employee
to know whether or not she was breaching the agreement. 10 7 Ac10 8
cordingly, the court found the contract to be unreasonable.
102. SeeWilson v. Radio One, Inc., No. 05-1087, at 3-4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2005)
(order granting preliminary injunction) (finding that Radio One, Inc. no longer
operated rock station in Philadelphia).
103. SeeWilson Findings, No. 05-1087, at 11-13 (announcing decision of court
not to enforce non-compete based on lack of legitimate business interest resulting
from change in format).
104. See Cullman Broad. Co. v. Bosley, 373 So. 2d 830, 835 (Ala. 1979) (finding non-compete clause valid due to importance of customer base within employer's county); Beckman v. Cox Broad. Corp., 296 S.E.2d 566, 569 (Ga. 1982)
(discussing and enforcing clause covering thirty-five mile radius from broadcasting
company's offices); Murray v. Lowndes County Broad. Co., 284 S.E.2d 10, 10-11
(Ga. 1981) (holding non-compete covering one county reasonable geographic limitation); Midwest Television, Inc., v. Oloffson, 699 N.E.2d 230, 235 (Ill. App. Ct.
1998) (upholding clause for 100 mile radius of broadcasting tower based on employer's legitimate broadcast capacity); Clooney v. WCPO Television Div. of
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 300 N.E.2d 256, 258-59 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973) (upholding non-compete clause covering area within 100 miles of television station); New
River Media Group, Inc. v. Knighton, 429 S.E.2d 25, 26-27 (Va. 1993) (giving consideration to restricting employee from engaging "in a business that competed
with New River within 60 miles of New River's broadcast station").
105. For a discussion of the typical broadcasting non-compete clause location
provision, see supra note 104 and accompanying text.
106. See Wake Broad., Inc. v. Crawford, 114 S.E.2d 26, 28 (Ga. 1960) (holding
unreasonable "catch-all" non-compete clause prohibiting employee from working
in radio or television within fifty mile radius of any city in which broadcasting corporation operated or began to operate during term of employment contract).
107. See id. at 28 (finding lack of notice of prohibited locations in contract
made clause unreasonable to comply with).
108. See id. at 28-29 (determining clause unenforceable).
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Duration

Most courts enforce non-competes that impose durations between six months and two years. 109 In some cases, however, even a
one year restriction can wreak havoc on a broadcaster's career. 110
In Midwest Television, Inc. v. Oloffson, for instance, the court enforced a one year non-compete clause against a discjockey. 11 1
Oloffson wanted to host a show with a "different musical format" on
a competitor's station.1 1 2 The court found that Oloffson's popularity might cause the original employer to lose advertising if he had a
show on a competitor's station. 1 13 Oloffson, however, feels that the
11 4
year off destroyed his career.
4.

Range of ProhibitedActivities

The range of prohibited activities covered in broadcasting noncompete clauses are sometimes evaluated based on balancing factors to determine reasonableness. 1 5 Such provisions can include
prohibiting an employee from appearing on a rival station's program with a similar format. 116 A court might uphold a clause, how109. See, e.g., Culman Broad. Co., 373 So. 2d at 831-32, 836 (upholding employer's one year non-compete clause protecting "substantial right in its business"); Beckman, 296 S.E.2d at 567, 569 (holding valid 180 day non-compete
clause); Murray, 284 S.E.2d at 10-11 (upholding two year non-compete clause as
reasonable); Midwest Television, Inc., 699 N.E.2d at 235 (upholding one year noncompete clause as reasonable in relation to acquiring new customers); Clooney, 300
N.E.2d at 259 (upholding one year non-compete clause); New River Media Group,
429 S.E.2d at 27 (enforcing twelve month non-compete clause).
110. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 718 ("Oloffson worked for one year on-air at
the new station after the non-compete restriction expired, and then the station
went under. He regained employment but not his past popularity. Today he is
unemployed in the Peoria market." (citing Interview with Gary Oloffson, Former
Radio Disc Jockey, in Peoria, Ill. (Dec. 24, 2001))).
111. See Midwest Television, 699 N.E.2d at 237 (upholding prior court's issuance of injunction validating non-compete clause).
112. See id. at 232 (noting that two shows had different formats).
113. See id. at 235 ("Midwest's concern that its listeners and advertisers would
follow him to a station within an overlapping broadcast zone is not unreasonable.
In fact, Midwest's station manager testified that both listeners and advertisers followed Oloffson when he moved between its AM and FM stations.").
114. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 718 (noting difficulty Oloffson faced when
trying to reestablish his broadcasting career).
115. See Beckman v. Cox Broad. Corp., 296 S.E.2d 566, 568-69 (Ga. 1982)
(balancing employer's business interests with factors including loss suffered by employee and reasonableness).
116. See id. at 569 (enforcing covenant preventing employee personality from
appearing on-air with local competitor for 180 days).
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ever, which prevents a former employee from occupying a variety of
117
different positions for a competitor.
In Murray v. Lowndes County BroadcastingCo., for instance, a ra-

dio announcer signed a non-compete agreement that prohibited
him from working in several positions.' 18 The court held that because the employee could work as a radio engineer and occupy
other positions, the restriction was reasonable in preventing him
from taking any of the positions listed in his contract throughout
the duration set forth in the non-compete agreement.11 9 Murray
20
eventually obtained a position as a disc-jockey in Georgia.'
When covenants in this area become more restrictive, radio
and television station consolidations in the broadcasting industry
become more problematic.' 2 1 Mergers between some major competitors may cause some states to create legislation to protect broadcasting employees from non-competes.1 22 States might consider
such changes because the fewer station owners there are, the more
117. See Murray v. Lowndes County Broad. Co., 284 S.E.2d 10, 10-11 (Ga.
1981) (upholding covenant preventing personality from working as announcer,
disc jockey, and advertisement seller, among other positions for rival station).
118. See id. at 10 (detailing positions former broadcaster could not occupy but
indicating other positions still available to him). The court noted that:
The contract contained the following language: "Employee agrees that if
his employment shall be terminated for any reason he will not engage in
the business of announcer, disc jockey, advertisement selling, station
manager or director for any other radio station in Lowndes County,
Georgia, for a period of two (2) years from the date of termination."
Id.
119. See id. at 10-11 (finding clause was reasonable).
120. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 717 (citing Interview with Gary Wisenbaker,
George Murray's former attorney, in Savannah, Ga. (Dec. 27, 2001)) (describing
Murray's career subsequent to enforcement of non-compete clause).
121. See Hawkins, Loca4 supra note 86 (noting Barry Skidelsky's assertion that
broadcasting employee's today face a "consolidated environment"); see also Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004, S. 2401, 108th Cong. § 1084(c) (1) (2004)
(noting Congressional findings of media industry consolidation since 1996). The
Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004 specifically cites increases in the number of radio stations owned by Clear Channel Communications, Cumulus Broadcasting, Inc., and Infinity Broadcasting Corporation, and the number of television
stations Viacom/CBS, GE/NBC and News Corp./Fox obtained over the past decade. See S. 2401, 108th Cong. § 1084(c) (1) (2004) (listing media acquisitions and
mergers).
122. See Hawkins, Loca4 supra note 86, at 1 ("'[W]ith new legislation emerging in various states to prohibit or restrict broadcast non-competes, in today's consolidated environment, we are likely to see more cases brought."' (quoting Barry
Skidelsky, former broadcaster)) (discussing possibility of employees obtaining preliminary injunctions preventing enforcement of non-competes); see id. S. 2401,
108th Cong. § 1084(c) (1) (C) (2004) (noting mergers have occurred between following: Viacom with CBS and UPN (2000), GE/NBC with Telemundo Communications, Inc. and Vivendi Universal Entertainment (2004), News Corp./Fox with
DirecTV (2003), and Time Warner, Inc. with America Online (2000)).
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likely an employee is to obtain a job working for a direct competitor. 123 In such a business climate, enforcing non-compete clauses

against employees in broadcasting might be considered less fair
124
than in other industries.
C.

Legislation and Non-Competes

Employees will more likely prevail in non-compete cases as efforts continue to create legislation that prevents courts from enforcing these agreements within the broadcast industry.1 2 5 States are
becoming increasingly concerned about the unique position of employees in this industry.1 26 These employees have less bargaining
127
power due to the scarcity in employment opportunities.
1.

Existing State Legislation

California has a statute with a provision preventing enforcement of non-competes in employment contracts generally. 128
There are exceptions to this provision, though, which allow courts
to enforce some non-competes if they do not prevent the promisor
from "plying its trade or business." 129 Further, California courts
may enforce contracts created outside of the state which include
non-competes, despite the California provision. 13 0 Several other
states have provisions similar to California's, which prevent the ap13
plication of non-competes in all industries. '
123. See Hawkins, supra note 27, at 1 (discussing difficulty in obtaining employment due to recent mergers in broadcasting industry).
124. See id. (noting plight of broadcasting employees in light of mergers).
125. See id. (postulating that growing support for legislation will yield more
success for broadcasting employees).
126. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 694 (discussing state trend of creating legislation protecting broadcasting employees from enforcement of non-competes).
127. See Potter, supra note 55 (stating that broadcasting employers have unusual amount of bargaining power over employees).
128. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2005) ("[E]xcept as otherwise
provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.").
But see Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 59 P.3d 231, 237-38 (Ca. 2002)
(holding out-of-state contract's non-compete clauses can be enforced in
California).
129. Brawer, supra note 8, at 699-700 (citing Malsberger, supra note 40, and
Gen. Commercial Packaging, Inc. v. TPS Package Eng'g, Inc., 114 F.3d 888, 891
(9th Cir. 1996)) (discussing potential to exploit loop-hole in California law).
130. See Advanced Bionics Corp., 59 P.3d at 237-38 (indicating out-of-state noncompete clauses are potentially enforceable in California).
131. See Hawkins, supra note 27, at 9 ("Alabama, California, Colorado, Montana, North Dakota and Oklahoma all have statutes on the books that effectively
prohibit the use of non-competes in any industry .... ."); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-1-1
(2005) (detailing Alabama statute); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 8-2-113 (2005) (detailing
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Some states chose to address the broadcasting industry specifically in their non-compete statutes.' 3 2 Maine and Massachusetts
were among the first states to go this route.' 3 3 Several other states
have since passed laws preventing the application of non-compete
34
clauses in the broadcasting industry.
The union representing broadcasters made considerable efforts to prevent the enforcement of non-compete clauses in broadcasting.' 3 5 The legislatures of several other states have proposed
bills to further this objective. 136 Oregon attempted to pass a bill in
2003 that would prevent the application of non-competes in the
Colorado statute); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (2005) (detailing Montana statute); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2005) (detailing North Dakota statute); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 15, § 219a (2005) (detailing Oklahoma statute).
132. See Brawer, supranote 8, at 702-07 (discussing different states' legislation
preventing use of non-competes in broadcasting).
133. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 599 (2005) (forbidding enforcement of
non-compete clauses in broadcast industry); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 149, § 186
(2005) (indicating Massachusetts law forbids non-competes in broadcasting).
Maine enacted a statute in 1999, specifically forbidding the application of noncompete clauses in most instances. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 599. The
Maine statute only applies, however, if the employee was terminated without fault
on his or her part. See id. Massachusetts enacted a similar statute which specified
broadcasting as a field in which non-competes will be enforced only in limited
situations. See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 149, § 186 (inferring statement from absence
of explicit restriction). The Massachusetts statute applies to all broadcasters regardless of why they are no longer employed by the person with whom the employment contract was made. See id.; see also Brawer, supra note 8, at 703 ("This statute
is the most comprehensive statute of those since enacted to protect employees in
the broadcast industry from non-compete agreements regardless of termination
procedures.").
134. See Amiz. REV. STAT. § 23-494 (LexisNexis 2004) (detailing Arizona's
broadcasting non-compete law and stating effective date Feb. 22, 2002); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 32-532 (LexisNexis 2005) ("A broadcasting industry employment contract
provision that requires an employee or prospective employee to refrain from obtaining similar with another broadcasting industry employer following expiration
of the contract or upon termination of employment shall be unenforceable."); 820
ILL. COMP. STAT. 17/10 (2005) (preventing enforcement of non-competes in
broadcasting industry).
135. See AFTRA-SAG: Maryland Non-Compete Bill Laid to Rest for Now,
http://www.aftrasagdcbalt.com/index.php?section=broadcast&sub=noncompetemd2005 (last visited Mar. 17, 2006) [hereinafter AFTRA-SAG] (discussing AFTRA's commitment to fighting non-competes). The article states:
AFTRA continues to believe that the use and enforcement of non-compete clauses in the broadcast industry is fundamentally unfair and that
employees ought to have the basic right to earn a living and build a career. We are unwavering in our commitment to pass legislation that will
ban the use of non-competes completely, as has been achieved in the
District of Columbia.

Id. 1 4.

136. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 704-06 (noting Iowa, Missouri, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Washington, and West Virginia's legislatures proposed legislation
on non-competes in broadcasting with varying results). The bills proposed in Iowa,
Missouri, Washington, and West Virginia did not pass. See id. at 704-05.
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broadcasting industry. 3 7 While this attempt also failed, American
Federation of Television and Radio Artists ("AFTRA") members intend to again raise the campaign to pass such legislation in Oregon. 13 8 Maryland attempted to pass legislation to prevent the
enforcement of non-competes earlier this year, but the attempt
139

failed as well.
Other states codified a reasonableness standard. 14 0 While the
wording varies, these jurisdictions typically require that the location, duration, and range of activities prohibited by a particular
clause be reasonable. 14 1 States continue, however, to enforce non-

competes.
2.

142

Pending Legislation
Some states have proposed legislation which would prevent

non-competes from applying in the broadcast industry. 143 Penn137. See H.B. 2390, 72nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2003), availableat http:/
/www.leg.state.or.us/ (click "Search" hyperlink; check "2003 Legislative Measures"
and enter "H.B. 2390"; follow "H.B. 2390.1 ha" hyperlink) (providing proposed
Oregon bill).
138. SeeJames Lurie, A Year of Legislative Accomplishments, AFTRA MAC., Winter
2004, at 6, available at http://aftra.org/news/magazine/Aftra2004.pdf. (explaining necessity for localized concentration against non-competes in-state by AFTRA
members); see also H.B. 2390, 72nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2003), available at
http://www.leg.state.or.us/ (click "Search" hyperlink; check "2003 Legislative
Measures" and enter "H.B. 2390"; follow "H.B. 2390.1 ha" hyperlink) (providing
proposed Oregon house bill).
139. See AFTRA-SAG, supra note 135 ("AFTRA's 2005 legislative campaign in
the Maryland General Assembly to prohibit non-compete clauses in the radio and
television contracts of broadcast employees, unfortunately came to a close this
month without a victory ....
[T]he politics of a few overtook the will of the
majority.").
140. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 445.774a (2005) (providing Michigan's reasonableness test for non-competes); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(a)
(Vernon 2005) (providing reasonableness standard for Texas non-competes); Wis.
STAT. § 103.465 (2005) (announcing reasonableness standard for enforceability of
non-competes in Wisconsin).
141. See MICH. COMP. LAws § 445.774a (providing Michigan's version of reasonableness standard); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(a) (giving Texas's
reasonableness standard); Wis. STAT. § 103.465 (illustrating Wisconsin's reasonableness standard).
142. See MICH. COMP. LAws § 445.774a (providing Michigan's non-compete
law, enforcing non-competes to extent they are reasonable); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 53-9-8 (2005) (voiding non-competes except as provided in §§ 53-9-9 to 53-9-12);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-101 (2005) (providing Tennessee's non-compete provi-

sion); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (providing Texas's non-compete law);
Wis. STAT. § 103.465 (providing Wisconsin's non-compete provision).
143. See S.B. 1297, 209th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2000), available at http://
www.njleg.state.nj.us/2000/Bills/S1500/1297I1 .PDF (providing NewJersey's proposed bill); S.B. 640, 143d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2001), available at http://
www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2001/Bills/Senate/HTML/S640vl.html
(illustrating North Carolina's pending bill). NewJersey's bill was read a second time by the
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sylvania State Senator Jane Clare Oie (R-Pittsburgh) introduced
legislation that prohibits employers from requiring the inclusion of
144
non-compete clauses in broadcasting employment contracts.
Currently, Pennsylvania relies on common law by applying a reasonableness standard to evaluate the enforceability of non-compete
clauses. 145

Violations under the proposed Act would expose employers to
potential civil damages and misdemeanor criminal charges. 146 AFTRA, a union that represents broadcasters and other entertainers,
supports this potential law. 14 7 Such laws have now become more
necessary due to increased corporate consolidation of radio and television stations.1 48 These business developments make it even
more difficult for employees to obtain new positions without
1
breaching non-compete clauses.

49

assembly without recommendation in 2000 and the assembly has taken no action
since. See NewJersey Legislature, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us (enter "S1297" into
"Bill number" search box; choose "2000-2001" from "Legislative Session" drop
down menu; click "Search" button; follow "A1305" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 17,
2006) (noting last action taken). The North Carolina General Assembly re-referred its bill to the Commerce Committee on April 23, 2001, and the bill still
remains there. See North Carolina Legislature, http://www.ncga.state.nc.us (enter
"S640" into "Bill Look-Up" search and choose "2000-2001" from "Site Searches"
drop down menu; click "Go") (last visited Mar. 17, 2006) (noting, under "History"
heading, that last action was referral to Committee on Commerce).
144. See S.B. 442, 2005-2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005) (Broadcast
Industry Free Market Act), available at http://www2.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/
BI/BT/2005/0/SB04420465.pdf (illustrating current version of proposed Pennsylvania broadcast non-compete statute). The Pennsylvania General Assembly referred the bill to the Labor and Industry Committee on March 22, 2005. See
Pennsylvania General Assembly, http://www.legis.state.pa.us (enter "SB442" into
"Bill" search field; click "Go"; click "Bill History" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 17,
2006) (noting last legislative action taken).
145. See Hess v. Gebhard, 808 A.2d 912, 917 (Pa. 2002) (explaining current
approach Pennsylvania courts take towards enforceability of non-competes).
146. See Hawkins, supra note 27, at 8 (describing sentences provided in proposed bill).
147. See id. (noting AFTRA supports proposed Pennsylvania bill); American
Federation of Television & Radio Artists, http://www.unionvoice.org/aftranetwork/home.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2006) ("The American Federation of
Television and Radio Artists is a national collective bargaining union with nearly
80,000 members - actors, singers, dancers, announcers, broadcasters and recording artists - served by 25 AFTRA Local [sic] offices around the country.").
148. See Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004, S. 2401, 108th Cong.
§ 1084(c) (1) (2004) (listing mergers in media industry occurring since 1996).
149. See Hawkins, supra note 27 (noting unfairness of non-competes in light
of corporate consolidation in media industry).
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D. Applying Law Preventing Enforcement of Non-Competes
to Wilson
To better understand how laws preventing the use of non-competes in the broadcasting industry work, this Section applies these
laws to the Wilson facts, as if they had happened in various jurisdictions. 150 The laws are examined to determine which are most effective at preventing the enforcement of non-competes in the
broadcast industry. 151 This illustrates how each law's operation provides guidance to jurisdictions considering the adoption of such
laws in the future.
1. Applying the Broadcast Industry Free Market Act to Wilson
The plaintiffs in Wilson had a non-compete clause in their employment contract with Radio One, Inc. 152 The clause provided
that the employees could not appear on air or assist in programming for another radio station. 53 The agreement prohibited certain activities within a fifty-mile radius of Philadelphia and
15 4
remained in effect for six months.
If enacted, Pennsylvania's proposed Broadcast Industry Free
Market Act will prevent the enforceability of this clause. 15 5 The em150. See Wilson v. Radio One, Inc., No. 05-1087, at 1-2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2005)

(order granting preliminary injunction) (reciting facts of case).
151. For a further discussion of the application of broadcasting non-compete

laws to the facts in Wilson, see infra notes 152-81 and accompanying text.
152. See Wilson Findings, No. 05-1087, at 2-3 (E.D. Pa. filed May 3, 2005) (on

file with author) (reproducing paragraph thirteen of employment agreement

signed by Wilson and Morrison). Their non-compete clause contained the follow-

ing language:
Employee shall not, at any time during employment or during the six (6)

month period after the date Employee is no longer employed by Employer for any reason, engage, directly or indirectly, or through any partnerships, corporations or any other legally recognizable entity or
associates in any business, enterprise or employment which is directly

competitive with Employer. "Competitive" shall mean that the Employee
shall not appear on a radio station as an announcer or personality... or
assume responsibility for programming a radio station located within a

fifty (50) mile radius of Employer's principle place of business in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Id. (ellipsis in original).
153. See id. (providing prohibited activities).
154. See id. (announcing location and duration restrictions applicable to

employees).
155. See generally S.B. 442, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005), availableat

http://www2.legis.state.pa.us/WUO1/LI/BI/BT/2005/0/SBO442pO465.pdf (last

visited Feb. 9, 2006) (providing current version of proposed bill). The bill states:
[N]o broadcasting industry employer may require in any employment

contract with a broadcast employee that the broadcast employee ... refrain from obtaining employment:
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ployment agreement would violate the proposed bill because it con-

tains a clause prohibiting the employees from obtaining
employment in a geographic area. 156 Further, the clause violates
the proposed law because it prevents them from working in the region for six months.15 7 Finally, the non-compete clause violates the
law because it prohibits them from working in a particular industry.1 58 Therefore, the non-compete clauses in Wilson and Morrison's employment contracts directly contravene the proposed
9
law. 15
It is unclear whether the proposed law would apply even if it
was in effect at the time Wilson and Morrison terminated their contracts. 160 There is uncertainty because the law contains no provision specifying whether it would apply retroactively or only
prospectively.1 6 1 Pennsylvania courts would likely be unable to ap162
ply the proposed law to contracts that are already in existence.
(1) in a geographic area;
(2) for a specific period of time; or
(3) for any particular employer or in any particular industry;
after termination of employment with the broadcasting industry
employer.
Id. § 3(a).
156. See Wilson Findings, No. 05-1087, at 3 ("'Employee shall not appear on a
radio station or as an announcer or personality . . . or assume responsibility for
programming a radio station within a fifty (50) mile radius of Employer's principal
place of business in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania."' (ellipsis in original) (quoting
Wilson and Morrison's employment contract)).
157. See id. at 2 (reproducing phrase in employment contract prohibiting
competing with employer for "the six (6) month period after the date Employee is
no longer employed by Employer").
158. See id. at 3 (providing language from non-compete limiting future employment such that "the Employee shall not appear on a radio station as an announcer or personality . . . or assume responsibility for programming a radio
station").
159. See generally S.B. 442, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005), available at
http://www2.legis.state.pa.us/WOO1U/LI/BI/BT/2005/0/SBO442pO465.pdf (last
visited Mar. 19, 2006) (providing current version of proposed Pennsylvania broadcast non-compete statute).
160. See id. (lacking provision indicating when law goes into effect). "This act
shall take effect in 60 days." Id. (providing Section 5).
161. See id. (lacking provision specifying whether law applies retroactively).
162. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1926 (West 2005) ("No statute shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the General
Assembly."); Keystone Coal Mining Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 673
A.2d 418, 420 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) ("[S]tatutes must be given prospective effect
only, unless the statute includes clear language to the contrary." (citing Green v.
Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 573 A.2d 209 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984))). "Amendatory statutes, in particular, are to be construed as retroactive only where such a construction is so clear as to preclude all questions as to the intent of the General
Assembly." Keystone, 673 A.2d at 420. For an example of the failure of a noncompete law to apply retroactively in another jurisdiction, see Maureen F. Brennan, Corporate and Business Law: Noncompetiton Agreements, 51 LA. B. J. 359, 359
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For this reason, significant edits may be necessary before the proposed law would be useful to current broadcasting employees who
163
hope to avoid enforcement of non-compete clauses.
2.

Applying OtherJurisdictions'Laws to Wilson

The Massachusetts provision is clearer than the proposed
Pennsylvania law because it specifically prohibits the enforcement
of non-compete agreements. 164 The Massachusetts law contains
similar prohibitions to the proposed Pennsylvania law. 165 The Massachusetts statute's enactment made this language obsolete, but
similar to Pennsylvania courts, Massachusetts courts apply the statute only prospectively.' 66 Therefore, if Wilson and Morrison had
signed a similar contract in Massachusetts, Radio One, Inc. might
still be able to enforce the non-compete agreement depending on
67
when the contract was entered into.1
(2004) ("The 3rd Circuit applied the rule contained in Article 6 of the Civil Code
that, in the absence of a legislative directive, interpretive laws apply retroactively,
but substantive laws apply prospectively only."). The Louisiana Appeals Court decided not to apply a provision on non-competes in the Louisiana laws retroactively
because it determined that the law was substantive in that it created a new rule. See
id. (citing Sola Commc'ns, Inc. v. Bailey, No. 03-0905 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/10/03));
see also LA. Civ. CODE ANN.art. 6 (2005) (providing Louisiana's retroactivity of laws
provision).
163. See generally S.B. 442, 2005-2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005), available at http://www2.legis.state.pa.us/WUO1O/LI/BI/BT/2005/O/SBO442pO465.pdf
(last visited Feb. 9, 2006) (lacking provision for retroactive application).
164. See MASS. GEN. LAwS ch. 149, § 186 (2005) (indicating non-compete
clauses are "void and unenforceable").
165. See id. (detailing Massachusetts's broadcasting non-compete provision).
The statute states:
Any contract or agreement which creates or establishes the terms of
employment for an employee or individual in the broadcasting industry,
including, television stations, television networks, radio stations, radio
networks, or any entities affiliated with the foregoing, and which restricts
the right of such employee or individual to obtain employment in a specified geographic area for a specified period of time after termination of
employment of the employee by the employer or by termination of the
employment relationship by mutual agreement of the employer and the
employee or by termination of the employment relationship by the expiration of the contract or agreement, shall be void and unenforceable with
respect to such provision. Whoever violates the provisions of this section
shall be liable for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs associated with litigation of an affected employee or individual.
Id. (emphasis added).
166. See id. (voiding language comprising non-compete clause). According to
the law's Historical and Statutory Notes, " [ t] his Act shall apply to contracts entered
into on or after its effective date." See id. (citations omitted).
167. See generally Wilson Findings, No. 05-1087, at 2-3 (E.D. Pa. filed May 3,
2005) (on file with author) (reproducing non-compete clauses from Wilson's and
Morrison's employment contracts).
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Maine takes a different approach to non-compete clauses. 168
Maine's statute creates a presumption of unreasonableness for language creating a non-compete. 169 Therefore, if Radio One, Inc.
sought to enforce the clauses against Wilson and Morrison in
170
Maine, the court would presume the clauses are unreasonable.
The language in the proposed Pennsylvania statute is similar to
Arizona's broadcasting non-compete law. 171 The Arizona law states:
"[A] s a condition of employment, it is unlawful for a broadcast employer to require a current or prospective employee to agree to a
noncompete clause.' 72 The Arizona law specifies that it applies to
both current and prospective employees, 1 73 so it arguably applies to
contracts already in force. If the facts in Wilson took place in Arizona, it would have been unlawful for Radio One, Inc. to require
Wilson and Morrison to agree on the inclusion of a non-compete in
174
their contracts.
Pennsylvania's proposed law also closely mirrors Illinois's
broadcasting non-compete law. 175 This law prohibits employers
from requiring the inclusion of language in broadcasting employment contracts that would restrict an employee's job opportuni168. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 599 (2005) (detailing Maine's broadcasting industry non-compete law).
169. See id. (detailing provision Maine adopted to limit enforcement of noncompetes). The Maine law provides:
PRESUMED UNREASONABLE. A broadcasting industry contract
provision that requires an employee or prospective employee to refrain
from obtaining employment in a specified geographic area for a specified
period of time following expiration of the contract or upon termination
of employment without fault of the employee is presumed to be
unreasonable.
Id. § 599(2).
170. Compare Wilson Findings, No. 05-1087, at 2-3 (reproducing non-compete
clause from Wilson and Morrison's employment contracts), with ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 599(2) (detailing Maine's statutory language concerning non-compete clauses).
171. Compare ARiz. REv. STAT. § 23-494 (LexisNexis 2004) (providing Arizona's non-compete law), with S.B. 442, 2005-2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa.
2005), available at http://www2.legis.state.pa.us/WU01 /LI/BI/BT/2005/0/
SB0442p0465.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2006) (giving proposed Pennsylvania law).
172. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 23-494(A).
173. See id. ("As a condition of employment, it is unlawful for a broadcast
employer to require a current or prospective employee to agree to a noncompete
clause.").
174. Compare Wilson Findings, No. 05-1087, at 2-3 (reproducing non-compete
clauses from Wilson's and Morrison's employment contracts), with ARIz. REv. STAT.
§ 23-494(A) ("As a condition of employment, it is unlawful for a broadcast employer to require a current or prospective employee to agree to a noncompete
clause.").
175. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 17/10 (2005) (prohibiting certain provisions in
employment contracts).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006

25

416

Jeffrey S. Moorad
Sports&Law
Journal,
Vol.JOURNAL
13, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 5
VILLANovA
SPORTS
ENr.
LAw
[Vol. 13: p. 391

ties. 176 The problem with the Illinois statute is that it does not
indicate whether it should be applied retroactively or whether the
state will continue to enforce clauses in already existing contracts. 17 7 If the facts in Wilson occurred in Illinois and the statute
applied, Radio One, Inc. would have been prohibited from requiring Wilson and Morrison to agree to the non-compete clauses in
78
their contracts.'
Washington D.C.'s law takes an approach similar to the approach taken in Massachusetts.1 79 The D.C. law makes non-compete clauses unenforceable at the time the contract expires or the
employee terminates employment. i8 0 If Wilson occurred in Washington, D.C., it seems the employer could not enforce the clause
upon Wilson and Morrison's termination of employment.' 8 '
E.

Pros and Cons of Preventing Non-Competes

There are arguments for and against the use of legislation to
prevent courts from enforcing non-competes. 18 2 These provisions
176. See id. ("Post-employment covenants not to compete are prohibited. (a)
No broadcasting industry employer may require in an employment contract that
an employee or prospective employee refrain from obtaining employment in a
specific geographic area for a specific period of time after termination of employment with that broadcasting industry employer.").
177. See id. (lacking a provision applying the law retroactively); Brennan,
supra note 162, at 359 (explaining Louisiana statute's lack of treatment of issue
and discussing decision in Louisiana court not to retroactively apply law in noncompete context).
178. See generally 820 ILL. ComP. STAT. 17/10 (2005) (prohibiting employer
from requiring employee to sign non-compete agreement).
179. Compare D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-532 (2005) (providing District of Columbia's broadcast industry non-compete law, which declares non compete clauses
'unenforceable"), with MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 149, § 186 (2005) (providing Massachusetts law, which also declares broadcasting non compete clauses
'unenforceable").
180. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-532 ("A broadcasting industry employment contract provision that requires an employee or prospective employee to refrain from
obtaining similar employment with another broadcasting industry employer following expiration of the contract or upon termination of employment shall be
unenforceable.").
181. Compare Wilson Findings, No. 05-1087, at 2-3 (summarizing non-compete
clauses from Wilson's and Morrison's employment contracts), with D.C.-CODE ANN.
§ 32-532 ("A broadcasting industry employment contract provision that requires
an employee or prospective employee to refrain from obtaining similar employment with another broadcasting industry employer following expiration of the
contract or upon termination of employment shall be unenforceable.").
182. For a further discussion of the pros and cons of adopting legislation
which would prevent the enforcement of non-compete clauses in broadcasting, see
infra notes 183-220 and accompanying text.
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are useful when negotiating contracts.18 Further, broadcasters are
represented by a strong union that should have the power to protect their interests despite the use of non-competes. 1 84 The recent
push to adopt such legislation indicates concern about the use of
185
non-competes in broadcasting employment contracts.
1. Freedom to Contract
The freedom to contract is sometimes discussed in determining the reasonableness of non-competes in broadcasting contracts.' 8 6 Employers have a strong argument that they should be
free to negotiate the terms of employment with potential employees without interference from the state. 187 Legislation, however,
would prevent employers from paying for costly litigation in this
area by prohibiting non-competes entirely. 8 8s Further, employers
would remain free to negotiate other terms of the contract such as
salary and promotion.18 9
2.

Unions- Do They Provide Enough Protection?

Employers may argue that employees in the broadcast industry
are well represented by unions. 190 Unions, such as AFTRA, are vigilant supporters of legislation to prevent non-competes in broadcasting.19 1 "The union serves as a check on employee myopia and the
19 2
employee's tendency to disregard low-probability events as well."
Unions may even want to allow non-competes to remain in broadcasting contracts in order to create incentives for the employers to
183. For a further discussion of the use of non-competes in negotiation, see
infra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
184. For a discussion on AFTRA's influence in negotiations, see infra notes
190-96 and accompanying text.
185. For a further discussion of the laws states have adopted to prevent the
enforcement of non-competes, see supra notes 125-42 and accompanying text.
186. See Beckman v. Cox Broad. Corp., 296 S.E.2d 566, 568 (Ga. 1982) (citing
Uni-Worth Enters. v. Wilson, 261 S.E.2d 572 (Ga. 1979)) (listing freedom to contract as factor in determining reasonableness of non-compete clause).
187. See Baker, supra note 19, at 683-84 (explaining why unions should negotiate to remove non-competes from broadcasting contracts rather than resorting to
legislative remedies).
188. See id. at 683 ("A blanket prohibition on covenants not to compete would
provide a clear, predictable rule and save litigation costs.").
189. See id. at 678-79 (discussing trade-offs between non-competes, wages, and
advertising promotion in broadcasting employment contracts).
190. See id. at 678 (discussing argument that unions provide bargaining power
for broadcasting employees).
191. See generally AFTRA-SAG, supra note 135 (discussing AFTRA's efforts to
pass broadcasting non-compete laws).
192. Baker, supra note 19, at 678.
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invest in promoting these personalities and continue to create jobs
19 3
for broadcasting personalities.
This argument lacks merit because AFTRA vehemently protests
the inclusion of these clauses in broadcasting contracts. 19 4 Further,
these clauses allow employers to exert even more control over the
careers of their broadcasting employees. 195 While employers can
facilitate an employee's rise to fame, they can also take it away by
preventing that employee from taking advantage of that fame for
one year or more. 19 6
3.

Employers Lose Incentives to Promote Personalities

Employers commonly argue that they are responsible for the
employee's name-recognition. 1 97 They claim that the employee's
fame results directly from the expenditures the employer has made
to promote the personalities. 98 The argument continues that if
stations can no longer benefit from promoting particular personalities, they will lose their incentive to promote these personalities.1 99
It is hard to know, however, whether advertising dollars alone are
20 0 Commuresponsible for the popularity of certain broadcasters.
nity involvement, abilities, or personalities that people admire,
among other things, might increase a broadcaster's popularity regardless of the attention personalities are given in advertising
193. See id. (emphasizing unions' responsibility to object to clauses). Baker
states:
With regard to the substantive terms of noncompetes, the fact that
the union has not objected to such clauses in collective bargaining negotiations indicates that broadcast companies are able, in at least some instances, to offer inducements to enter into noncompetes that are of
greater value to the employee than the right to market his human capital
freely after his contract of employment has ended.
Id.
194. Cf AFTRA-SAG, supranote 135, 3 (discussing AFTRA's belief that noncompete clauses are "fundamentally unfair").
195. See Potter, supra note 55 (reporting on unusual amount of power broadcasting employers have over employees).
196. See Baker, supra note 19, at 678-79 ("There is a trade-off between increased promotional investment, and the employee's obligation to share the fruits
of that investment with the station that made that investment.").
197. See Midwest Television, Inc. v. Oloffson, 699 N.E.2d 230, 233 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1998) (detailing argument that advertising expenditure resulting in employee's
fame is legitimate business interest).
198. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 725 (explaining broadcasting employer's argument that protecting investment in promoting personalities is legitimate business interest).
199. See Gould, supra note 18 (describing employers'justifications for enforcing non-competes).
200. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 725-26 (discussing other reasons for broadcasters' popularity).
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schemes.2 0 1 Indeed, Wilson and Morrison appear to possess such
qualities. 20 2 Precedent in some courts, though, has shown support
20 3
for the station's interests in several cases arguing this theory.
4.

Protection of Employees

Employees may possibly sign a contract including a non-compete clause based on the assumption that they will never be required to break their contract. 20 4 Employees may also sign such
contracts without being informed of the conditions of their employment. 20 5 This argument lacks force in the broadcasting industry

because a number of cases dealing with the enforcement of noncompete clauses in the contracts of radio and television personalities have increased awareness of the issue. 20 6 Further, because of
the activity of AFTRA in this area, it would be difficult for any member employee to argue they were unaware of the existence of such
20 7
clauses.
Radio and television station advocates may argue that unions
provide broadcasters with all of the bargaining power they require
201. See Richmond Bros., Inc. v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 256 N.E.2d 304,
307 (Mass. 1970) (illustrating other reasons for broadcaster's fame). The court
stated:
Even though a broadcasting company may have expended large sums to
promote a performer's popularity with the listening public, it would indeed be difficult to determine that such expenditures and promotion
have resulted in the performer's popularity. The performer's popularity
may well be attributed to his own personality and ability.
Id.
202. See FMQB article, supra note 2 ("'Preston & Steve are such a winning
combination - an entertaining and experienced show admired by listeners and advertisers alike for their exceptional talents, unique promotions, and wonderful
community involvement. We're thrilled to have them join the WMMR team.'"
(quoting John Fullman, Greater Media Vice-President & Market Manager)).
203. See, e.g., T.K. Comms., Inc. v. Herman, 505 So. 2d 484, 486 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) ("The breach consists of intangibles that cannot be replaced by money
damages; for instance, the use of the disc jockeys' valuable names and reputations
and the capitalization on the disc jockeys' popularity."); Beckman v. Cox Broad.
Corp., 296 S.E.2d 566, 567 (Ga. 1982) (stating "during the term of Beckman's
employment with Cox, WSB-TV spent in excess of a million dollars promoting
'Beckman's name, voice and image as an individual television personality and as
part of WSB-TV's Action News Team'..." (footnote omitted)).
204. See Baker, supra note 19, at 677 (discussing employees' inability to plan
for potentially bad futures).
205. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 712-13 (discussing employers' failure to adequately explain terms of contract to broadcast employees).
206. See Baker, supra note 19, at 680 (noting high possibility of employee
awareness of ramifications of non-competes in broadcasting industry due to enforcement of non-competes in "a number of high profile cases").
207. See Lurie, supra note 138, at 6-7 (discussing AFTRA's campaign to stamp
out non-competes in broadcasting through legislation).
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to be on equal footing. 20 8 When one looks closely at this highly

competitive industry, however, it becomes apparent that obtaining
a job in broadcasting "feels like winning the lottery without the financial windfall." 20 9 The perceived (or actual) inequality in bargaining power can impact employment decisions.
When obtaining employment in one's chosen field is highly
unlikely, a person is more inclined to sign a contract even if it is
unfair to them.2 10 Even when there is a union, the fear of not getting the same opportunity again provides incentive to the employee
to sign the contract, which gives the employer more power in hiring
decisions. 2 1 1 This gives employers an unfair amount of leverage

over the employee's career.2 1 2 Employers argue that employees in
other industries deal with non-compete clauses, but employees in
other industries potentially have more flexibility in changing their
jobs in a way that does not cause them to break their non-compete
2 13
agreements.
208. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 19, at 678 (arguing that union presence makes
bargaining power equal between broadcasting employers and employees).
209. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 711 (opining that finding employment on-air
in broadcasting is difficult task).
210. See Potter, supa note 55 ("'Employers wield overwhelming power,' says
Dominique Bravo, legislative and legal affairs director for AFTRA, the union that
represents broadcast talent. In a tight job market and in a consolidated industry
like broadcasting, she says, 'You sign or you don't get the job.'"); DPE, NewsLine,
Department for Professional Employees: Protecting Media Workers, (Jan. 2004),
http://www.dpeaflcio.org/news/newsline/newsline-2004-01.htm
[hereinafter
DPE] ("Such restrictions have a devastating effect upon the careers of these workers by, in effect, preventing them from earning a living or improving their economic standing within their chosen profession."). The Department of Professional
Employees represents unions. See Department for Professional Employees About
DPE - Who We Are, http://www.dpeaflcio.org/about.htm (last visited Mar. 19,
2006) ("The Department for Professional Employees, AFL-CIO (DPE) currently
represents 22 unions comprising over four million white collar workers.").
211. See Potter, supra note 55 (detailing situations of certain broadcasting employees). Potter explains:
Because of non-competes, some high-profile anchors have been
forced to sit at home instead of practicing their craft. Tracy Rowlett, who
worked at WFAA in Dallas for 25 years, was off the air for nine months
before joining cross-town rival KTVT; Barbara Ciara waited a year after
leaving WVEC to return to the anchor desk at WTKR, also in Norfolk.
Ultimately, though, they got what they wanted: same job, same town, different station.
Id.
212. See DPE, supra note 210 ("For both aspiring and veteran broadcasters
and journalists, these caveats are often the non-negotiable price of being hired in a
take-it-or-leave-it environment that allows media employers to amass unreasonable
economic leverage over these professionals.").
213. See Potter, supra note 55 (detailing arguments advanced for each side).
Such arguments specifically include:
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Further, employees in smaller markets who have families and
community ties have far less bargaining power than those who intend to use the smaller community networks as a jumping off
point.2 1 4 While a non-compete clause may not be harmful for a

broadcast personality in Allentown, Pennsylvania, who intends to
someday move to a California market, the same clause will have a
serious effect on an Allentown family man who has lived in the city
for most of his life and whose children attend school there.2 1 5 Such
a person is likely to become locked into a position with no hope of
ever leaving the station with whom he signed the non-compete because his other options are to uproot his family or to leave them
behind and take an out-of-town job. 216 The employee might avoid
this if he is fired, but, in that case, finding a newjob without moving
may be impossible until his non-compete expires. At that point, his
2 17
name recognition will have weakened or disappeared.
Perhaps an industry does not collapse without non-competes.2 1 8 The success of California's technological industry indicates that the absence of enforceable non-competes did not hurt

Employers who favor non-competes say it's discriminatory for states

to make them illegal only for broadcast contracts, pointing out that doctors, sales people, and even employees at nail salons sometimes sign similar agreements. But AFTRA argues that sales people can always switch to
another industry, keep working and stay in the same town. Broadcast
journalists either have to wait, move or get out of the business. Unless, of
course, they're in management.
Id.
214. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 711-13 (demonstrating unequal bargaining
power between employer and employee).
215. Cf id. (explaining difficulties settled employees face); Baker, supra note
19, at 659-60 (exploring different situations of two employee types); Potter, supra
note 55 (detailing how Fox News reporterJon Du Pre "never would have moved if
he hadn't been forced to because of a noncompete clause in his contract at KPNX
in Phoenix"). "'It's tough having to start over every few years,' he told the Arizona
Republic. 'I promised I would not do this to my kids, but it turns out I am because
of the nature of this business."' Potter, supra note 55 (quoting Jon Du Pre).
216. See Potter, supra note 55 (noting that unlike other professionals, broadcasters cannot easily obtain similar positions in their field without leaving town or
violating a non-compete).
217. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 716-18 (discussing outcome in certain employee situations).
218. See Baker, supra note 19, at 674 (discussing support for contention that
California's prevention of enforcement of non-competes caused some of Silicon
Valley's success).
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the industry. 2 19 Instead, the free flow of ideas allows for more rapid
220
innovations in the field.

IV.

CONCLUSION

There is support for the contention that non-compete clauses
are unfairly enforced in the broadcast industry. 22 1 States may use

legislation to deter the use of non-competes in the broadcast industry. 222

Still, lack of interest or support for such legislation is
223

problematic.
It is prohibitively expensive for broadcasters to take these cases
to court, as they often lose.2 24 Wilson and Morrison's situation
shows some possibility that such cases may prevail on the merits as

support for legislation in this area increases. 225 Communities
should not be prevented from having the best possible entertainment unless broadcasting employers can show a legitimate and
strong business interest in stifling competition. 226 The reasons cur-

rently employed by broadcasting employers, such as advertising dollars spent and the uniqueness of the product they claim to have
created in an on-air personality, seem weak in the face of the dam227
age that these clauses can do to broadcasters' careers.
Pennsylvania should consider making the Broadcast Industry

Free Market Act law, as this would prevent non-competes from applying in the broadcast industry by enforcing civil and criminal pen219. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructureof High Technology Industrial
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv.
575, 608-09 (1999) (noting success of California industry).
220. See id. (emphasizing how "knowledge spillover" allowed industry to
thrive); Baker, supra note 19, at 674 ("[W]hen highly skilled employees move between firms taking ideas and innovations with them, the rapid diffusion of information more than compensates for the investment disincentives that arise when
noncompetes are not enforceable." (quoting Gilson, supra note 219)).
221. See Potter, supranote 55 (discussing plight of broadcasters in face of noncompete clauses).
222. For a discussion of states currently using legislation to prevent the enforcement of non-competes, see supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
223. Contra Hawkins, supra note 27, at 8 (listing examples ofjurisdictions enacting legislation).
224. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 714-15 (explaining difficulty broadcasters experience in affording court battles).
225. See Hawkins, supranote 27 (mentioning effect of proposed legislation on
awareness of problems in broadcasting).
226. See West Group Broad., Ltd. v. Bell, 942 S.W.2d 934, 937-38 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997) (finding that radio station's legitimate interest argument lacked
merit).
227. See Brawer, supra note 8, at 716-18 (describing problems faced by broadcasting employees).
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alties on employers who include them in contracts. 22 8 If this
measure seems too drastic, Pennsylvania might also consider drafting a statute that would make employers prove a stronger business
interest than potential, but unsubstantiated, losses in advertising
dollars or audiences. 229 If non-compete clauses remain in place,
broadcasting employees could be forced to come up with clever
ways to avoid their effects.

230

Cristin T. Kist
228. See S.B. 442, 2005-2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005), available at
http://www2.legis.state.pa.us/WUO1/LI/BI/BT/2005/0/SBO442pO465.pdf (last
visited Feb. 9, 2006) (giving proposed Pennsylvania law).
229. See Hawkins, Local, supra note 86 (discussing plaintiffs' experts' arguments in Wilson that "The Beat" and WMMR do not "target the same audiences"
and that advertisers would not leave Y-100 because of Wilson and Morrison); see
also Wilson v. Radio One, Inc., No. 05-1087, at 3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2005) (order
granting preliminary injunction) (finding that employer has no legitimate business interest because of changed format of station).
230. See Paul Heine, WMMR Trumpets Arrival of Former Y1O0 Morning Show,
BIui-oARD RADIO MONITOR, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.airplaymonitor.com/radiomonitor/news/format/rock/article-display.jsp?vnu-contentid= 1000818753
("By 10 a.m., it was a veritable media circus on 'MMR, with a pair of 11-year-old
girls serving as translators for Preston & Steve, whose non-compete agreement with
Radio One prohibits their voices (but not their names) to air on 'MMR for a sixmonth period.").
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